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64 Abstract
This paper discusses the costs and benefits of government borrowing in foreign 
currency. While discussing the main costs, such as increased exposure to currency 
and rollover risks, and limited capacity to respond to financial crises, this paper 
also identifies two benefits of foreign currency borrowing. The paper also explores 
to what extent governments of non-euro area EU member states rely on foreign 
currency borrowing and whether they have sufficient capacity to preserve cur-
rency stability in the event of adverse shocks. The analysis suggests that the public 
finances of these countries are not heavily exposed to currency risk. Exceptions to 
this are Bulgaria and Croatia, whose government debt is mainly denominated in 
euros, and who also suffer from high loan and deposit euroization. It is therefore 
not surprising that they are the first two among the remaining non-euro area EU 
member states to take steps towards the introduction of the euro.








sensitive to changes in the country’s risk profile. If the risk profile deteriorates,
investorsmaychoosetowithdrawfromitsbondstoavoidlossesthatcouldoccurif

















































































































thatBulgaria andCroatia are thefirst among the remainingnon-euro areaEU
memberstatestotakeconcretestepstowardstheintroductionoftheeuro.How-
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66 2  COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT BORROWING IN FOREIGN 
CURRENCY
2.1 COSTS OF FOREIGN CURRENCY BORROWING











(1999)note thatmostdevelopingcountriesareunable to issueexternaldebt in
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67Figure 1


































Note: The simulation is performed assuming that the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is 50%, the pri-
mary deficit is zero, the share of foreign currency debt in total government debt equals 70%, the 
nominal GDP growth rate is 4%, while the weighted nominal interest rate on debt, initially set 
at 4%, increases following the depreciation of the currency to 5% in t+1, and further to 6% in 
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68 limited,sothereislittleriskthattransactionsinthesecuritiesmarketwillexert
strongdownwardpressureonthecurrency.
















currency borrowing. Indeed, financial crises in emergingmarket countries are
usually preceded by periods of abundant inflow of foreign currency funding.
Namely,ifglobalfinancialconditionsarefavourable,emergingmarketcountries
willhaveanincentivetoimportcapitalfromabroadtofinancedomesticconsump-













































































































cover their largebalanceofpaymentsneeds.By the late1970s, ithadbecome






















the modern globalized economy characterized by flexible exchange rates and
extensive cross-border financial flows. These disruptive events have occurred
fromtimetotimethroughouthistory,evenwhentheentireworldreliedonfixed
exchangeratesandwhengrosscapitalflowsweresubduedbymodernstandards.
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again in 2020 after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.While member
statesinitiallyfailedtoreachanagreementonacommonfiscalresponsetothe
crisis,bymid-March2020, theECBhadalreadysteppedinbyannouncingthe
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71Under this program, theECBhasbeenpurchasing large amountsof euro area
public and private sector securities eachmonth in order to prevent borrowing
costsfromincreasingsignificantly.SuchaninterventionbytheECBwascritical
intheacutephaseofthecrisisasiteasedpressuresonthecountriesparticularly
affected by the pandemic and enabled their governments to finance healthcare
spending and economic relief programs at low cost. Central banks of other
advancedcountriestooksimilaractionsinresponsetothecrisis.
Figure 2
Borrowing from the Eurosystem as percent of banks’ total liabilities




















































































































































































tries to tackle banking and sovereign debt crisis on their own. In this respect,
dependence on foreign currency borrowing could definitely be considered a
“curse”becauseitmakesthecountrybothmorelikelytoexperienceafinancial
crisisandlesscapableofmanagingthecrisisifoneoccurs. 
2.2 BENEFITS OF FOREIGN CURRENCY BORROWING











































































































































up foreign currency reserves that can later be used to contain liquidity distur-
bancesinthebankingsystem.
Government borrowing as a channel of reserve accumulation is particularly







































































































Government foreign currency borrowing and reserve accumulation in Croatia

































































Net purchases from banks - LHS 
Net purchases from the Ministry 
of Finance - LHS 
Gross international reserves - RHS 
Other 
factors* 
9.6% Total net purchases 
from the MF 38.7% 
(EUR 5.1 billion)
Total net purchases from banks 
51.7% (EUR 6.8 billion)
* Other factors relate to exchange rate changes and transactions with the EU budget.













contain the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic required additional
financingfromabroad(CNB,2020).
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75assetscarryapositiveinterestrate,thecentralbankmakesaprofitfrommanaging
them.12Asmostcentralbanks–aftercoveringtheiroperationalexpenses–allo-















3  HOW CAN A COUNTRY THAT BORROWS IN FOREIGN CURRENCY 
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76 sovereigndebtcrisiswhenthegovernmentisindebtedinforeigncurrencyiseven




3.1 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
The benefits of having ample foreign exchange reserves aremanifold (Ljubaj,
2019).Ifreservesarelargeenough,theyshieldthecurrencyfromexcessivefluc-
tuationsandspeculativeattacks,guaranteethatthecountryiscapableofconduct-





of reservesprovidesassurance to investors that thegovernmentwillbeable to
continueservicingitsforeigncurrencyliabilitiesevenifittemporarylosesaccess
tofinancialmarkets.Asmentionedearlier, if thefinancialsystemisdollarized,
foreignexchangereservesplayanadditional importantrole,as theyenable the
centralbanktoassistbanksintheeventofaliquiditycrisis.
Figure 4
Composition of central bank assets, end-2018 (in %)



































































































































3.2 THE ROLE OF OTHER MACRO-FINANCIAL FUNDAMENTALS
Themost effective instrument inpreventinga sovereigndebt crisis is obviously
prudentfiscalpolicy.Bymaintainingabalancedbudgetandkeepingthedebt-to-
GDPratiolowenough,thegovernmentwillminimizetheriskofasuddenlossof
















crisis episodes documented in the previous chapter, themain problemwas that
countriesreliedtooheavilyonshort-termexternalfinancing.
Notonlyshouldaresponsiblefiscalpolicybeconductedbutdueattentionshould
be devoted tomonetary andfinancial sector policies.As is generally accepted
today,monetarypolicyshouldfocusonkeepinginflationincheck.Bykeepingthe
inflationrateclosetotheinflationratesofthemaintradingpartners,thecentral
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78 financialsectorpolicies,authoritiesshouldexercisevigilantsupervisionandpro-
activelyusemicroandmacro-prudential regulation,becauseerrors in thisarea
mayhavenegativeconsequencesforthepublicfinances.16Macro-prudentialregu-
lationhasbecome increasinglypopular in theaftermathof theglobalfinancial















4 ARE PUBLIC FINANCES IN THE EU EXPOSED TO CURRENCY RISK?




Europe (CEE),whichhave shallow localfinancialmarkets and thereforeoften
relyonexternal sourcesof funding.Bycontrast, in thenorthernnon-euroarea
memberstates–DenmarkandSweden–foreigncurrencyborrowingisnotasys-
temicproblem.Intheseadvancedcountries,foreigncurrencyborrowingismainly
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79Figure 5 
Currency composition of government debt, 2018 (in %)

































reason the local currency begins to lose ground against the foreign currency in
whichdebtisdenominated,thegovernmentwillseeitsdebtratioincrease.Figure6




































































































Exposure of public finances to currency risk, 2018, in % of GDP
Debt increase in case of a 20% depreciation Government debt, end 2018

















Bulgaria Croatia Romania Poland Hungary Czech R.
Source: Eurostat (2020a); author’s calculations.
Asfigure7shows,thesamecountriesthatstandoutwithaparticularlyhighshareof
foreigncurrencydebtintotalgovernmentdebtarethecountriesthathavethemost
heavily euroized banking systems. Specifically, inBulgaria andCroatia, foreign
currencydepositsaccountforalargeshareoftotalbankingsystemliabilities,while
this isnot thecase incountries suchasPolandor theCzechRepublic.The link
betweenthecurrencycompositionofgovernmentdebtandthedegreeofeuroization








by non-residents in the ownership composition of government debt.20 In other
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81Figure 7
Foreign currency deposits with commercial banks, 2018, in %
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Foreign currency liabilities and gross international reserves, 2018, in percent of GDP









Bulgaria Croatia Romania Poland Hungary Czech R.
Source: Eurostat (2020c); national central banks; author’s calculations.












tofinancial assistance from the IMFand theEU tomake the transition easier.


































































































External fundamentals of CEE countries, 2007 and 2018, in percent of GDP
a)CurrentaccountbalanceandNIIP b)Internationalreserves
Current account balance (2007) - left 
Current account balance (2018) - left 
International investment position (2007) - right



















































Bulgaria Croatia Romania Poland Hungary Czech R.
Source: IMF (2020d).
Figure 10
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inamajorforeigncurrency, if thereareonly looseconnectionswith thecountry






ily indebtedLatinAmerican countries to service their dollar debts: not onlydid




































































































Geographical composition of merchandise trade of selected countries, 2018
a)Non-euroEUmemberstates(in%) b)LatinAmericanandAsiancountries(in%)













































































































































































highly sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. In the case of depreciation, the
debt-to-GDPratiowouldincreaseimmediately,whilethefiscalbalancewouldbe






















documented in thispaperclearly show thatdebt andcurrencycrisesare likely
whenthegovernmentisborrowingtoomuchonshortmaturities,whenreserves
areinsufficient,therealexchangerateisovervaluedandcreditgrowthisexces-









































































































tionalmajor source of vulnerability.The introduction of the eurowould bring
substantialbenefitstoBulgariaandCroatiaintermsoflowerriskexposureand
higherresiliencetofinancialcrises.ItisthereforenotsurprisingthatBulgariaand
Croatia are the first among the remaining non-euro areaEUmember states to
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